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Abstract
Background: Savant syndrome is a condition where prodigious talent can co-occur with developmental conditions
such as autism spectrum conditions (autism). It is not yet clear why some autistic people develop savant skills while
others do not.
Methods: We tested three groups of adults: autistic individuals who have savant skills, autistic individuals without
savant skills, and typical controls without autism or savant syndrome. In experiment 1, we investigated the cognitive
and behavioural profiles of these three groups by asking participants to complete a battery of self-report measures of
sensory sensitivity, obsessional behaviours, cognitive styles, and broader autism-related traits including social
communication and systemising. In experiment 2, we investigated how our three groups learned a novel
savant skill—calendar calculation.
Results: Heightened sensory sensitivity, obsessional behaviours, technical/spatial abilities, and systemising were
all key aspects in defining the savant profile distinct from autism alone, along with a different approach to
task learning.
Conclusions: These results reveal a unique cognitive and behavioural profile in autistic adults with savant
syndrome that is distinct from autistic adults without a savant skill.
Keywords: Autism spectrum conditions, Savant syndrome, Sensory processing, Cognition, Perception, Talent,
Skill learning
Background
People with savant syndrome are characterised by their re-
markable talent in one or more domains (e.g. music,
memory) but also by the presence of some form of devel-
opmental condition such as autism spectrum conditions
(henceforth autism) [1]. Autism describes a set of symp-
toms involving difficulties in social communication, un-
usually repetitive/routine behaviours, unusually narrow
interests, and atypical sensitivity to sensory stimuli [2]. Re-
cent models of autism also focus on strengths associated
with the condition (not just on their difficulties), in areas
such as perceptual and cognitive processing [3], systemis-
ing [4], and attention to detail [5], as well as areas of inter-
est, aptitude, and talents. In savant syndrome, talents and
skills observed in such individuals far exceed their own
overall level of intellectual or developmental functioning.
Exceptional cases of prodigious savant syndrome occur
when an autistic individual’s level of skill goes beyond
that seen even in the general population. A well-known
example of a prodigious savant is the artist Stephen
Wiltshire who is capable of drawing hyper-detailed city-
scapes from memory and who also has autism [6]. Sav-
ant skills can exist in a variety of areas, but most savants
show skills in art (e.g. hyper-detailed drawings), music
(proficiency in musical instrument playing), maths (fast
mental arithmetic), calendar calculation (the ability to
provide the day of the week for any given date), and
memory recall of facts, events, numbers etc. [7].
Although savant syndrome can co-occur with a range
of developmental conditions, most cases involve autism
in some form [8, 9] and savant syndrome has been re-
ported to occur in up to 37% of autistic individuals [10].
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The emergence of savant skills in autistic adults is not
fully understood, and there is a lack of empirical evi-
dence to support current theories. The motivation for
the current research is to understand the condition of
savant syndrome in more depth by contrasting a group
of autistic savant individuals with a group of autistic in-
dividuals who do not have a savant skill. A third group
of typical controls without autism or savant skills serve
as a comparison. With this approach, we aim to separate
features that are tied to savant syndrome from features
that are tied to autism per se. We ask what individual
differences lie within the autistic population that might
allow some to develop savant skills while others do not.
We first summarise current theoretical frameworks on
the origins of savant skills. We then present two experi-
ments that consider the development of savant skills at
multiple levels of cognition, perception, and behaviour.
There is no consensus on exactly how savant skills are
developed in autistic individuals. Bölte and Poustka [11]
showed that savants do not show differences in standard
intelligence compared to other autistic individuals. It
could therefore be that their skills develop simply
through many hours of extended practice. This would be
similar to the abilities of neurotypical ‘memory athletes’
who can, for instance, memorise thousands of digits of
pi using mnemonic techniques, with top performers
relying on thousands of hours of practice—as in other
sports [12–14]. Savants too appear to require practice,
but here we ask exactly why they practice and whether
they also have cognitive or perceptual differences beyond
practice alone.
Two theoretical models have bridged the gap between
need-for-practice and autistic symptoms in savants [15,
16]. Happé and Vital [15] proposed that one way in
which savant skills might emerge could be through the
autism-related trait of mind-blindness, which is the diffi-
culty in attributing mental states to others [17, 18].
Happé and Vital [15] suggest that a lack of interest in
the social world could serve to free up cognitive and
time resources that are usually dedicated to monitoring
social interactions. As a result, these extra resources
could be re-allocated to the development of talent by
permitting more time (i.e. practice) to the nurturing of
restricted interests commonly observed in autistic indi-
viduals. Since these cognitive resources have been allo-
cated away from monitoring social interactions, a
further expected consequence might also be lower social
and communication skills in savants and we explore this
in experiment 1 below.
In contrast, Simner et al. [16] suggest that the hours
spent achieving savant ability are the result not of
mind-blindness, but of the autism-linked trait of obses-
siveness—i.e. savants have an obsessive urge to over-re-
hearse their skills to prodigious levels. Tentative support
for this comes from LePort et al. [19] who showed that a
group of individuals with prodigious event-memory
(some of whom are likely to be savants [16]) showed
higher obsessional traits than controls. However, the
controls they tested did not have autism, making it un-
clear whether obsession was tied to savant skills per se
or simply to autism (or other co-occurring neurodeve-
lopmental differences [20]). O’Connor and Hermelin
[21] compared savants to controls with autism and drew
similar conclusions about obsessiveness—but their ques-
tionnaire also contained items unrelated to obsessions
(e.g. decision-making). In addition, they may not have
corrected their question-by-question statistics for mul-
tiple comparisons, making it difficult to tie their findings
to any particular trait. Similarly, Howlin et al. [10] used
a questionnaire of just five questions, testing repetitive
behaviours with a number of other traits (e.g. sensory
sensitivity), again making it difficult to interpret their
findings (of no difference between autistic-savants and
autistic-nonsavants).
Finally, Bennet and Heaton [22] found higher scores
for savant children on a five-question factor they named
‘obsessions and special interests’ compared to autistic-
nonsavants, but traced this back to an individual ques-
tion related to becoming absorbed in different topics.
Given these differences across studies in their focus,
questionnaire length, and testing groups, it remains un-
clear whether savants are particularly notable for their
obsessional traits, above and beyond what we would ex-
pect from autism alone. Here we test both models de-
scribed above, i.e. to see whether savants are particularly
notable for their obsessional traits or for traits that are
linked to mind-blindness (e.g. social and communica-
tion skills), compared to autistic individuals without
savant skills.
Although both types of rehearsal (from mind-blindness
or obsessiveness) could influence savant skills, this practice
alone probably does not act as the only catalyst for talent to
emerge. There may also be differences in certain cognitive
abilities, linked to autism, which manifest themselves more
strongly in individuals who acquire savant skills compared
to those who do not. Specifically, we propose here and pre-
viously [16, 23] that talent could emerge from autism traits
such as excellent attention-to-detail, hyper-systemising, and
sensory differences. For example, the combination of
attention-to-detail and hyper-systemising may predispose
some autistic individuals to develop talent through the in-
creased detection of ‘if p, then q’ rules [23]. These rules can
be found in savant skills such as calendar calculation (i.e.
stating the weekday for a given date) and can be learned
from predictable patterns within the calendar itself.
A related proposal is Mottron et al.’s [24] ‘veridical
mapping’ that links savant talent to the enhanced ability
of autistic individuals to detect regularities within and
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between systems. Some savant skills do indeed depend
on mapping regularities across systems (e.g. mapping
from musical pitch to note-label in absolute pitch). In
addition, savants appear to show a particular cognitive
style of enhanced local processing, as outlined in the en-
hanced perceptual functioning model [3], and less global
interference (e.g. in a target-detection task [25]) at least
when activities demand active interaction [26]. Again,
however, it is not clear whether these influences are tied
to being a savant or simply having autism. Here we test
groups of autistic individuals with and without savant
syndrome to examine whether savants have a particular
cognitive style (e.g. local bias), as well as elevated
autism-related traits such as systemising.
Savant talent may also have important sensory compo-
nents. Baron-Cohen et al. [23] argue that heightened sen-
sory sensitivity may be the pre-requisite for excellent
attention-to-detail, which they theorise as an autistic trait
linked to savant syndrome. Subjective accounts of sensory
irregularities in autism have been shown previously [27–
30], and multiple studies have objectively demonstrated
superior visual, auditory, and tactile sensory perception in
autism [31–36]. These sensory differences may bring
about the emergence of talent by affecting information
processing at an early stage [23] although this suggestion
is not universally supported [22].
One final sensory link between autism and savant syn-
drome is the presence of synaesthesia, where stimuli such
as letters, numbers, and sounds invoke automatic and
additional sensory experiences such as colours [37, 38].
Hughes et al. [39] found that synaesthesia occurs at higher
levels among autistic individuals with savant skills (but
not those without savant skills). Simner et al. [37]
hypothesised that the obsessive over-rehearsal of savants
may focus particularly on skills born out of synaesthesia,
building on earlier work [25]. Elsewhere, we have already
supported one branch of this model by showing that
people with synaesthesia have elevated skills in savant
domains (e.g. event recall [16]). Here we test the other
branch of the model by examining whether their rehearsal
is born out of obsessive traits [16] or mind-blindness
which might predict lower social or communication skills
[15]. Finally, we test the role of sensory sensitivities more
generally, by comparing the sensitivities of autistic individ-
uals with and without savant skills.
In our experiments, we look at two groups of autistic in-
dividuals, with and without a savant skill (specifically, pro-
digious talents which are above the skills of the general
population). In experiment 1, we contrast our groups on
cognitive and sensory self-report measures predicted by
previous theoretical accounts. We test differences related
to sensory sensitivity using the Glasgow Sensory Question-
naire (GSQ) [30], we test obsessive-behaviours using the
Leyton Obsessional Inventory (LOI) [40], we test cognitive
styles (e.g. local bias) using the Sussex Cognitive Styles
Questionnaire (SCSQ) [41], and we test autistic traits such
as systemising using the Systemising Quotient-Revised
(SQ-Revised) [42] and the Autism Spectrum Quotient
(AQ) [43]. In addition to our two groups of autistic in-
dividuals, with and without savant skills, we also test a
typical control group with neither autism nor prodi-
gious talents.
As stated above, there is very little empirical evidence
to evaluate current theories of savant syndrome apart
from tentative pointers towards increased obsessionality
[16] and evidence for links to synaesthesia [16, 39]. Our
goal is to test all theories directly; therefore, our predic-
tions are based on the above theoretical frameworks.
Following the theory by Baron-Cohen et al. [23], we pre-
dict that savants, relative to autistic individuals without
a savant skill, will report more traits or behaviours re-
lated to sensory sensitivity, attention-to-detail, and sys-
temising. We also predict they will report a more local
(as opposed to global) cognitive style since this has pre-
viously been implicated in (e.g. visual search) advantages
in autism and has been theorised to contribute to the
development of savant skills [44]. Based on the model of
autism-linked obsessive rehearsal [16], we predict that
autistic-savants will report more obsessional behaviours
compared to autism individuals without a savant skill.
Alternatively, the rehearsal account based on mind-
blindness [15] predicts that autistic savants would have
lower social or communication skills (here measured
using the AQ) compared to autistic individuals without
a savant skill. Finally, we predict that both autism
groups, regardless of the presence of a savant skill, will
report heightened traits or behaviours in all of the above
areas compared to the typical control group.
Experiment 2 investigates how a distinct psychological
or behavioural profile in savants (explored in experiment
1) might influence performance on a behavioural task.
We test the same three groups, to determine whether sa-
vants have a particular style of learning when presented
with a novel savant skill: calendar calculation. As noted
above, calendar calculation is the ability to give the cor-
rect day of the week for a given date in the past or fu-
ture (e.g. 18th September 1990 was a Tuesday) and is
considered one of the most characteristic savant abilities
[7]. In experiment 2, three groups of participants (autis-
tic-savants, autistic-nonsavants, controls) learned how to
calendar calculate through a series of tutorials about dif-
ferent patterns and rules of the calendar. It is unclear
whether calendar-calculating savants rely on rote mem-
orisation of dates [45] or internalisation of the inherent
rules of the calendar (e.g. 1st March 2013, 2014, 2015 =
Friday, Saturday, Sunday respectively) or indeed whether
they use some multi-faceted approach [44]. No studies
to date have investigated the learning of calendar
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calculation skills in savants (who do not already possess
this skill) compared to nonsavant autistic individuals and
controls; therefore, our predictions below are again
based on current theoretical models of savant syndrome.
If savant syndrome is linked to pre-existing abilities or
dispositions (as opposed to practice alone), then we pre-
dict that savants may show a superior level of accuracy.
In particular, the ‘enhanced perceptual functioning’ and
‘veridical mapping’ models predict more accurate per-
formance by savants from their superiority in learning
pattern/rule-based skills [3, 24, 44]. In contrast, accounts
of savant skills that emphasise obsession or practice may
not predict immediate advantages without extended
training but might predict a different learning approach.
Thus, if savants show increased repetitive/obsessive ten-
dencies, we might expect them to engage in a slower,
more careful approach to our calendar calculation task
from, for example, increased answer checking.
In summary, our studies investigate savant syndrome
by directly contrasting savants against a group of autistic
individuals without a savant skill as well as a typical con-
trol group. Our investigation is the first to take an em-
pirical approach to test a number of theoretical accounts
of savant syndrome [15, 16, 23, 24, 44], some of which
currently lack a clear empirical foundation.
Experiment 1: traits linked to savant syndrome
Methods
Participants
One hundred and eleven participants took part in the
study. They comprised 44 autistic individuals with savant
skills (‘autistic-savants’: 23 female; mean age 36.52, range
20–55, SD = 9.56), 36 autistic individuals without a savant
skill (‘autistic-nonsavants’: 23 female; mean age 36.67,
range 18–51, SD = 9.35), and 31 typical controls with nei-
ther autism nor a savant skill (‘controls’: 25 female; mean
age 36.84, range 18–50, SD = 10.94). Participants were
matched group-wise on age, with no significant differ-
ences across groups F(2, 110) = .009, p = .991.
Participants were recruited from two sources. Three of
the 44 autistic-savants were recruited from The Savant
Network, which is a group of individuals with a self-re-
ported savant skill who have expressed an interest in
taking part in research studies at the University of Sus-
sex. The remaining autistic-savants were recruited from
the Cambridge Autism Research Database (CARD). All
autistic-nonsavant individuals and all controls also came
from CARD, which holds status information of both aut-
ism and typical participants. To ensure that our autism
participants had sufficient cognitive levels to independ-
ently provide consent, we sent our recruitment materials
to high functioning autistic adults, as detailed in the
CARD database of autistic participants. Participants
volunteered to take part in our study in response to an
email advertisement that was sent to 4172 participants
in these databases (553 autistic-savants, 930 autistic-
nonsavants, and 2689 typical adults). The email did not
describe the nature of our tests but invited participants
to take part in studies that look into how people ‘per-
ceive and interact with the world around them’. Partici-
pants did not receive payment for taking part, and our
study was approved through the Cross-Schools Science
and Technology Research Ethics Committee at the Uni-
versity of Sussex. In addition to the 111 participants, we
additionally recruited but subsequently excluded 12 fur-
ther participants because they initially indicated autism
but failed to meet our criteria when probed further (see
the ‘Procedure’ section).
All individuals in the autism groups (autistic-savant;
autistic-nonsavant) self-reported having a formal diagno-
sis of autism in our questionnaire (see the ‘Materials’
section): 9 autism, 64 Asperger syndrome, 1 pervasive
developmental disorder not otherwise specified, and 6
other. These formal diagnoses had also been recorded
for 77 of the 80 autistic individuals as part of their
CARD recruitment procedure. There were no controls
who reported autism. All autistic-savants, and no other
group, self-reported having a savant skill (in our Sussex
Savant Questionnaire; see below).
Materials
We administered the following questionnaires: the Sus-
sex Savant Questionnaire (SSQ), the Glasgow Sensory
Questionnaire (GSQ) [30], the Leyton Obsessional In-
ventory—short form (LOI) [40], the Sussex Cognitive
Styles Questionnaire (SCSQ) [41], the Systemising
Quotient-Revised (SQ-R) [42], and the Autism Spectrum
Quotient (AQ) [43]. These are described below.
Sussex Savant Questionnaire
This questionnaire was created for the purposes of this
study. An initial question asked ‘Have you received a formal
diagnosis of any of the following: Autism, Asperger Syn-
drome, Pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise
specified; ‘other’?’. Next, we provided a definition of prodi-
gious savant syndrome and then asked: ‘Do you think that
you have any skills, abilities, or talents (e.g. art, maths,
music etc.) that are beyond the abilities of the general
population?’ Participants who responded in the affirmative
to this question were given a list of nine categories of savant
skills to choose from and used check boxes to indicate the
skills that were relevant to them (see Fig. 1). One option
was ‘other’ with a text-box provided for elaboration.
Autism Spectrum Quotient
The AQ contains 50 items to measure autistic traits in
adults of average or above average intelligence [43]. The
AQ contains 10 statements for each of five different
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subscales: social skills, attention switching, attention-to-
detail, imagination, and communication. Participants
responded to each statement on a four-point scale (def-
initely agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree, definitely
disagree). Example items included ‘I find it hard to make
new friends’, ‘It does not upset me if my daily routine is
disturbed’, and ‘I find it difficult to imagine what it would
be like to be someone else’. Approximately half of the
questions are reverse coded. Responses were coded as 0
or 1, with total scores ranging from 0 to 50. Items were
given a score of one point if the participant recorded an
autistic trait (e.g. exceptional attention-to-detail or poor
social skill) using the ‘slightly’ or ‘definitely’ response. A
total score of 32 or above is used is a strong indicator of
likely autism [43].
Systemising Quotient-Revised
The SQ-R contains 75 items with possible scores ran-
ging from 0 to 150, where a higher score suggests a
greater tendency to systemise. Systemising is defined
as the drive to identify and analyse systematic rela-
tionships or patterns in rule-based information. Partic-
ipants demonstrated their level of agreement with
each statement using a four-point scale (definitely
agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree, definitely dis-
agree). An individual scores two points if he/she
strongly displays a systemising response and one point
if they slightly display a systemising response, and ap-
proximately half the items are reverse-coded. Example
items included ‘When I look at a building, I am curi-
ous about the precise way it was constructed’ and ‘If I
were buying a stereo, I would want to know about its
precise technical features’.
Glasgow Sensory Questionnaire
The GSQ contains 42 items (scored from 0 to 4, ‘never’ to
‘always’ respectively, with possible total scores ranging
from 0 to 168) that explore unusual sensory behaviours,
for example, ‘Do you react very strongly when you hear an
unexpected sound?’ and ‘Do bright lights ever hurt your
eyes or cause a headache?’. The questionnaire measures
sensory sensitivity across seven modalities that include
visual, olfactory, auditory, gustatory, tactile, vestibular, and
proprioception. Each of these modalities is represented by
six items in the questionnaire, and this is further broken
down into three items each in order to measure both
hypo-sensitivity and hyper-sensitivity per modality.
Sussex Cognitive Styles Questionnaire
The SCSQ consists of 60 questions that assess the general
cognitive profile of an individual and his/her style of
thinking (e.g. visual/verbal cognitive styles). Each question
has one of five answers (strongly disagree, disagree, nei-
ther agree nor disagree, agree, strongly agree). Each ques-
tion is linked to one or more of six factors (imagery
ability, technical/spatial abilities, language and word
forms, need for organisation, global bias, and systemising).
The factor of ‘imagery ability’ refers to the use of visual
imagery in everyday life (e.g. ‘I often use mental images or
pictures to help me remember things’). The factor ‘tech-
nical/spatial abilities’ refers to technical interests (e.g. ‘If I
were buying a computer, I would want to know exact de-
tails about its hard drive capacity and processor speed’),
mathematical abilities (e.g. ‘I am fascinated by numbers’),
and the use of spatial mental imagery (e.g. ‘I can easily im-
agine and mentally rotate three-dimensional geometric
figures’). The factor ‘language and word forms’ refers to
Fig. 1 Savant skill categories, as presented during the savant skills questionnaire
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an interest in the visual appearance of written language as
opposed to spoken language abilities (e.g. ‘When I hear a
new word, I am curious to know how it is spelled’; ‘When
I read something, I always notice whether it is grammat-
ically correct’). The factor ‘need for organisation’ refers to
things relating to order and organisation (e.g. ‘If I had a
collection (e.g. CDs, coins, stamps), it would be highly
organised’). The factor ‘global bias’ refers to the tendency
to process stimuli holistically rather than by its local fea-
tures (e.g. ‘I usually concentrate on the whole picture, ra-
ther than the small details’). Reverse scored questions for
this factor indicate more attention-to-detail or a local pro-
cessing preference (e.g. ‘I tend to focus on details in a
scene rather than the whole picture’). Finally, the factor
‘systemising tendency’ refers to an interest in systems (e.g.
‘I am fascinated by dates’) and categorisation (e.g. ‘When I
look at an animal, I like to know the precise species it
belongs to’).
Leyton Obsessional Inventory—short form
The LOI consists of 30 questions that assess the pres-
ence or absence of obsessional symptoms using a ‘true/
false’ format. Each question relates to one of four factors
(contamination, doubts/repeating, checking/detail, and
worries/just right) in the questionnaire. Factor 1—‘con-
tamination’ is related to concerns about germs, dirty en-
vironments, obsessive cleanliness, and the excessive use
of cleaning products (e.g. ‘I avoid using the public tele-
phone because of possible contamination’). Factor 2—
‘doubts/repeating’ is related to uncomfortable thoughts,
repeating behaviours, checking, and serious doubts
about everyday things (e.g. ‘I frequently get nasty
thoughts and have difficulty getting rid of them’). Factor
3—‘checking/detail’ is specifically related to repeated
checking, too much attention-to-detail, conscience/hon-
esty concerns, and strict routine (e.g. ‘I am more con-
cerned than most people about honesty’). Factor 4—
‘worries/just right’ is related to behaviours such as taking
a long time to dress and to hang up and put away cloth-
ing, worrying about bumping into other people, and be-
lief in unlucky numbers (e.g. ‘some numbers are
extremely unlucky’).
Procedure
All participants were tested remotely via the online
survey-hosting platform Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com).
Participants (autistic-savants, autistic-nonsavants, and
controls) accessed the study by clicking on a URL pro-
vided to them electronically. After seeing the informa-
tion sheet and consent page, participants saw the
following questionnaires in order: SSQ, AQ, SQ-R, GSQ,
SCSQ, and LOI. For those participants recruited from
the CARD database, the AQ and SQ-R data were col-
lected in a separate procedure as part of the standard
protocol for participants when signing up to that data-
base. In this, participants completed the AQ and SQ-R
(among other tests) online during the sign-up stage of
recruitment. Our procedure took approximately 20 min
to complete, and participants were also asked a set of
additional questions for publication elsewhere (concern-
ing synaesthesia).
Results
Since some participants completed different elements of
our tasks (e.g. because they left before the end of the
study), we preface our results with the number of
participants in each test. All data here and throughout
approximated normal distributions and so parametric
statistics were used. We conducted a series of ANO-
VA’s to investigate group differences in each of our
measures separately.
Autism Spectrum Quotient
AQ data was collected from 33 autistic-savants, 30
autistic-nonsavants, and 28 controls, and Fig. 2 shows
every factor of the AQ. We conducted a 3 × 5 ANOVA
contrasting group (autistic-savants, autistic-nonsavants,
controls) and the individual AQ factors (social skills, at-
tention switching, attention-to-detail, communication,
imagination), and a main effect of group was found
(F(2, 88) = 96.96, p < .001, ηp2 = .69). There was also a
main effect of factor (F(4, 352) = 29.50, p < .001, ηp2
= .25) and an interaction between group and factor
(F(8, 352) = 7.44, p < .001, ηp2 = .15). Post hoc compari-
sons with Bonferroni correction revealed the same pat-
tern of results for every factor, that is, a significant
difference between autistic-savants and controls (all p
< .001) and between autistic-nonsavants and controls
(all p < .001), but not between autistic-savants and
autistic-nonsavants (all p > .05).
Where we found null results between autistic-sa-
vants and autistic-nonsavants for the AQ, we calcu-
lated Bayes factors to determine whether null results
indicated no difference or a lack of statistical power.1
We selected an informed prior (i.e. the mean differ-
ence we might expect between our participant groups,
and its standard error) from an earlier study [43]
using the same dependent variable as the current
study. This prior was generated by looking at the dif-
ference in AQ scores between UK Mathematics
Olympiad winners (N = 16) and autistic individuals (N
= 58), and we treat Mathematics Olympiad Winners
as a comparable group to autistic-savants in our own
study (i.e. both groups display some form of excep-
tional skill). This comparison was chosen because we
are looking to see whether differences truly exist
between our autistic-savants and autistic-nonsavants.
Our Bayes factors suggested support for the null
Hughes et al. Molecular Autism  (2018) 9:53 Page 6 of 18
hypothesis (i.e. no differences between groups) for
four of the five AQ factors (social skills BF < .33;
communication BF < .33; attention switching BF < .33;
imagination BF = .35) with the exception of
attention-to-detail, for which no firm conclusions
could be drawn (BF = 0.96). Refer to Additional file 1
for more information regarding our calculation of the
above Bayes factors including our choice of parame-
ters as well as a sensitivity analysis.
Systemising Quotient-Revised
SQ-R data was collected for 31 autistic-savants, 33
autistic-nonsavants, and 27 controls, and their data is
shown in Fig. 3. A one-way ANOVA comparing these
differences revealed a significant main effect, F(2, 90) =
23.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .35. Post hoc comparisons with
Bonferroni correction revealed significant differences be-
tween the autistic-savant and autistic-nonsavant group
(p = .022), the autistic-savant and control group (p
Fig. 2 The profile of AQ scores by factor and group scores (error bars show SEM). Asterisks here and throughout indicate significance at *p < .05;
**p < .01; ***p < .001
Fig. 3 Group differences in mean SQ-R scores (error bars show SEM)
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< .001), and the autistic-nonsavant and control group (p
< .001). In other words, the pattern was autistic-savants
> autistic-nonsavants > controls.
Glasgow Sensory Questionnaire
All participants completed this test. Figure 4 displays par-
ticipants’ total GSQ scores for the autistic-savant, autistic-
nonsavant, and control group. A one-way ANOVA com-
paring these differences revealed a significant main effect,
F(2, 110) = 29.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .35. Post hoc compari-
sons with Bonferroni correction revealed significant differ-
ences in total GSQ scores between the autistic-savant and
autistic-nonsavant group (p = .030), the autistic-savant and
control group (p < .001), and the autistic-nonsavant and
control group (p < .001). In other words, the pattern again
was autistic-savants > autistic-nonsavants > controls.
Sussex Cognitive Styles Questionnaire
All participants completed this test. Figure 5 shows all
factors of the SCSQ. We conducted a 3 × 6 ANOVA
contrasting group (autistic-savants, autistic-nonsavants,
controls) and the individual SCSQ factors. We found a
significant main effect of group (F(2, 108) = 6.06, p
= .003, ηp2 = .10), a significant main effect of factor (F(5,
540) = 31.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .23), and an interaction be-
tween group and factor (F(10, 540) = 7.69, p < .001, ηp2
= .13).
Post hoc comparisons with Bonferroni correction
revealed significant differences (all p < .05) between
autistic-savants and controls on technical/ spatial, need
for organisation, global bias, and systemising. Signifi-
cant differences (all p < .05) were also found between
autistic-nonsavants and controls on need for organisa-
tion, global bias, and systemising. A significant differ-
ence was also found between autistic-savants and
autistic-nonsavants on technical/spatial (p = .005). No
significant differences were found between any group
for ‘imagery ability’ or ‘language and word forms’. As
before, we calculated Bayes factors to determine
whether these null results indicated no difference or a
lack of statistical power. This time, however, no suit-
able previous studies exist from which to draw in-
formed priors. We therefore used an uninformative
prior with the H1 (prior distribution) modelled as a
uniform distribution in which all effects within a speci-
fied interval are considered equally likely (given no
previous evidence to inform our decision). Following
the standard procedure, we entered the lowest and
highest possible mean differences between groups (i.e.
zero and [maximum score per factor minus minimum
score] respectively). Our calculation of Bayes factors
suggests evidence for the null hypothesis for both im-
agery (BF = .22) and language (BF = .30). In summary,
we found that autistic individuals, irrespective of sav-
ant syndrome, scored higher than controls on need for
organisation, systemising, and local bias (i.e. low global
bias). In addition, autistic-savants out-performed con-
trols and autistic-nonsavants in technical/spatial traits.
Leyton Obsessional Inventory—short form
All participants completed this test. Figure 6 shows all
factors of the LOI across groups. We conducted a 3 × 4
ANOVA contrasting group (autistic-savants, autistic-
nonsavants, controls) and the individual LOI factors
(contamination, doubts/repeating, checking/detail, wor-
ries/just right). There was a significant main effect of
group (F(2, 108) = 16.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .23), a significant
main effect of factor (F(3, 324) = 90.78, p < .001, ηp2
= .46), and a significant interaction (F(6, 324) = 2.85, p
= .01, ηp2 = .05).
Fig. 4 Group differences in mean GSQ score (error bars show SEM)
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Post hoc comparisons with Bonferroni correction re-
vealed significant differences between autistic-savants
and controls on every factor (all p < .05). Significant dif-
ferences were also found between autistic-nonsavants
and controls on every factor (all p < .05) apart from the
worries/just right factor (p = .58). Finally, a significant
difference between autistic groups emerged on the wor-
ries/just right factor with autistic-savants scoring higher
than autistic-nonsavants (p = .02).
We also found that seven autistic-savants as well as
two autistic-nonsavants and one control scored above
the threshold of a score of 20 or more which suggests
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) symptoms. However,
a chi-square test of association between the rates of OCD
symptoms in the three groups did not reach significance
(χ2(2) = 4.34, p = .11.
Sussex Savant Questionnaire
All participants completed this test, whose aim had been
to separate our autism sample into our two autism
sub-groups (autistic-savants and autistic-nonsavants).
Table 1 shows the categories of skills asked about during
the study along with the number of cases of each skill
reported by participants. For completeness, the Add-
itional file 2 contain descriptive statistics for the various
sub-scales of our above questionnaire measures broken
Fig. 5 The profile of SCSQ scores by factor and group (error bars show SEM)
Fig. 6 The profile of LOI scores by factor and group (error bars show SEM)
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down according to the presence or absence of particular
savant skills, but we do not consider them in detail here
due to the large number of measures and lack of power
when smaller samples are divided in this way.
As an additional validation of our methodology, we
looked again at the skills reported in Table 1, to see
whether these self-reports could be directly tied to our
measures. We found a ‘dose-like’ effect in the number of
savant skills reported within our savant group. Here a
significant correlation was found between the number of
savant skills reported and the strength of the
technical-spatial abilities found in our Sussex Cognitive
Styles Questionnaire (r = .43, pcorrected = .01); none of our
other above effects were significant (all p’scorrected > .05).
Finally, we note that there were gender imbalances
across our groups (see [46] for gender effects in autism).
For an exploration of the effects of gender on all of our
above measures, see footnote.2
Discussion
Our results reveal a distinct profile of group differences
between autistic-savants and autistic-nonsavants. The
autistic-savants differed from autistic-nonsavants in that
the former had heightened sensory sensitivity, greater
obsessional behaviours (relating to excessive worries and
getting things ‘just right’), more systemising traits, and
increased technical/spatial traits (i.e. technical interests,
mathematical abilities, and the use of spatial mental im-
agery). In all instances, these traits are features of autism
more generally (i.e. they also discriminated between
autistic-nonsavants and controls) but were particularly
enhanced in savant syndrome specifically (i.e. discrimin-
ating autistic-savants from autistic-nonsavants). How-
ever, it is not the case that savants are simply shifted
upwards along the autism spectrum. We did not find
any differences between autistic-savants and autistic-
nonsavants on the AQ or on subscales relating to
attention-to-detail or social and communication skills,
which might otherwise have been expected based on
previous theoretical accounts [15, 23]. The implications
of these findings for other theoretical models are dis-
cussed in more depth in the ‘General discussion’ section.
Experiment 2: learning the novel savant skill of
calendar calculation
The purpose of experiment 2 was to explore whether par-
ticipants could be trained to perform a characteristic savant
skill—calendar calculation—and to investigate whether
autistic-savants would show differences in accuracy or
learning-style compared to autistic-nonsavants. As before,
controls without autism or savant skills were included to
separate effects linked to autism from effects linked to sav-
ant syndrome. Participants learned a number of different
calendar rules throughout a training session and were given
a final test that tapped all the rules. For example, the
‘matching month’ rule states that within any non-leap year,
certain months have matching structures (January =
October; March = November = February; September = De-
cember; July = April; e.g. if 1 March is a Sunday, then it ne-
cessarily follows that 1 November and 1 February will also
be Sundays in that year). Savants who have calendar calcu-
lating within their repertoire are already sensitive to these
rules [47]. For instance, they are faster at saying that 1 No-
vember is Sunday if it has been ‘primed’ by a preceding
question about 1 March (which has the same answer, as its
‘matching month’) than if preceded by 1 September (which
has a different answer). As well as examining the overall
ability to learn the task, we can use this pattern of response
times (i.e. faster responses for primed answers) as a meas-
ure of the degree to which the rules have been internalised
and are utilised by all subjects, and furthermore, whether
savants perform differently in either accuracy or speed.
In summary, this study aimed to determine whether
people with savant skills have a natural aptitude for
learning this kind of information or whether they ap-
proach the task with different strategies. If so, we as-
sess whether this is linked to autism per se or linked
only to those autism subjects with pre-existing savant
abilities (excluding calendar calculation). We predict
that savants may show either a superior level of ac-
curacy or a different style of approach to the question
(this latter suggested by response time measures and/
or a post hoc questionnaire).
Participants
Fifty-eight participants took part in experiment 2, 14 of
whom also took part in experiment 1 above (6 autistic-sa-
vants, 6 autistic-nonsavants, and 2 controls). The partici-
pants comprised 13 autistic-savants (4 female; mean age
37.54, range 23–56, SD = 9.11), 10 autistic-nonsavants (5
female; mean age 39.20, range 27–51, SD = 9.02), and 35
controls (29 female; mean age 32.26, range 20–50, SD =
Table 1 Types of savant skills reported by the autistic-savant
group, some participants reported having multiple savant skills
Skill types Number of cases
Math 16
Calendar calculation 3
Musical instrument playing 6
Music reproduction 9
Absolute pitch 12
Art 16
Memory 26
Mechanical (building) 8
Fluency for different languages 12
Other 25
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11.21). A one-way ANOVA showed no significant differ-
ences between groups on age, F(2, 57) = 2.37, p = .10, or
highest qualification, F(2, 57) = 2.23, p = .12. All individuals
in the autism groups (autistic-savant; autistic-nonsavant)
self-reported having a formal diagnosis of autism in our
questionnaire (see the ‘Procedure’ section): 3 autism, 18
Asperger syndrome, and 2 other. All autistic-savants, and
no other group, self-reported having a savant skill.
Participants were recruited from two sources. Forty-two
participants were recruited from CARD (13 autistic-sa-
vants, 10 autistic-nonsavants, 19 controls). The remaining
16 participants (all controls) were recruited from the Uni-
versity of Sussex community. Participants were entered into
a £50 prize-draw for their participation, and our study was
approved through the Cross-Schools Science and Technol-
ogy Research Ethics Committee at the University of Sussex.
In addition to the above participants, a further 22 were ini-
tially recruited but later excluded. These were 13 partici-
pants who used incorrect response buttons (i.e. the
right-hand numeric keypad rather than the number keys)
and 9 participants who were not engaging in the task.
Three of these had response times that were not within a
feasible range (i.e. < 700 ms; given the mean average RT for
other subjects of 12.4 s; SD = 5.3) and 6 scored below
chance, indicating they had not engaged with the calendar
rules presented during our test.
Materials and procedure
All participants received an initial email invitation
and accessed the study by clicking on a link embed-
ded in the email that took them to the information
and consent page. Participants then gave demographic
information and next completed the Sussex Savant
Questionnaire (SSQ) in the same way as in experi-
ment 1 above. Participants then completed additional
questionnaires to be published elsewhere (involving
synaesthesia). All participants then completed a test
of mental arithmetic (henceforth ‘maths test’) to en-
sure there were no a priori differences across groups
in maths ability. In this, participants saw 20 questions
requiring the addition of a pair of two-digit numbers
(e.g. 76 + 43). Participants were required to calculate
the answer as quickly as possible and type it into the
box provided. Following the maths test, participants
then began their calendar calculation training.
The calendar calculation training took place entirely
online using Inquisit, an online experiment-hosting soft-
ware and lasted around 35 min. Participants completed
a training session (composed of three tutorials) followed
by a final test at the end of the session. Each tutorial ex-
plained a set of patterns and calendar rules that can be
used to calculate days of the week for certain dates. Tu-
torial 1 taught participants about the matching-month
rule that explains that certain months cluster into
groups regarding their weekdays (see above for a further
explanation). Tutorial 2 taught participants the follow-on
month rule which states that months of the year can be
arranged in a particular sequence to calculate days of
the week faster (e.g. if 1 March 2015 is a Sunday, then it
follows that 1 June is a Monday and 1 September is a
Tuesday). Tutorial 3 focused on the 1-8-15-22-29 rule
which states that the 1st, 8th, 15th, 22nd, and 29th days
of the month all fall on the same day of the week (e.g. in
March 2015 all these dates fell on a Sunday). Each tutor-
ial was accompanied by examples of calendar images to
aid learning. At the end of each tutorial, participants
were given 2 min to memorise the material just covered
(without writing anything down) and then answered a
set of tutorial questions based on those rules. At the end
of all three tutorials, they completed the final calendar
calculation test (see below).
For the purposes of this study, we focused only on
teaching participants how to calculate days of the week
for the year 2015 (due to the time limitations of a single
study session). All questions (tutorial and final test) were
forced choice with each answer being one of the seven
days of the week. Participants answered using keys 1–7
on the keyboard and were given feedback (‘correct’; or
what the correct answer should have been e.g. ‘Tues-
day’). During the very first tutorial, participants with in-
correct responses had to then select the correct answer
to continue.
After all tutorials, participants completed the final cal-
endar calculation test. The test contained 40 questions
that spanned all the rules that had been taught previ-
ously and which again were dates that required partici-
pants to supply their weekday. Within these questions,
there were 20 ‘primed’ and 20 ‘unprimed’ dates. Primed
dates could be answered more easily than un-primed
dates by reference to the question before, given the rule
of ‘matching months’. As noted above, this rule exploits
the fact that 2015 has four groups of months, such that
dates within each group fall on the same weekday (e.g.
January and October are within the same group, so 8
January will fall on the same weekday at 8 October).
Hence, ‘primed’ questions should be easier to answer be-
cause the response is the same as the question before
(e.g. What weekday was 8 January? Answer: Thursday;
PRIMED = What weekday was 8 October 2015? Answer:
Thursday; UNPRIMED = What weekday was 8 Novem-
ber 2015? Answer: Sunday).
After the test, participants completed a questionnaire
(see Additional file 2) with two sub-sections, asking how
much they had enjoyed the study (Q7, Q8, Q9) and what
strategies they used (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4). These questions
were presented on a 1–5 Likert scale (strongly disagree,
disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, strongly
agree). An additional question (Q5) was to ensure
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subjects were paying attention, and two final optional
questions provided text boxes to enable participants to
add further information if they wished (Q6 and Q10; not
analysed). Once this enjoyment/strategy questionnaire
was complete, participants saw a final screen thanking
them for their time.
Results
Sussex Savant Questionnaire
Table 2 shows the categories of skills asked about during
the study. Importantly, no autistic-savants reported cal-
endar calculation as one of their savant skills, meaning
they should not have an advantage to other groups based
on prior abilities.
Maths pre-test
There were no significant differences in mental arith-
metic accuracy between the autistic-savants (M = 19.36,
SD = .51), autistic-nonsavants (M = 19.1, SD = 1.29), and
controls (M = 19.34, SD = 1.06), F(2, 55) = .76, p = .475.
There were also no significant differences in response
times between the autistic-savants (M = 6899, SD =
1887), autistic-nonsavants (M = 7675, SD = 1888), and
controls (M = 7100, SD = 2200), F(2, 55) = .420, p = .659.
This means that all things considered, no group started
with any a priori maths advantage.
Calendar calculation test
For accuracy scores, we conducted a 3 × 2 ANOVA con-
trasting group (autistic-savants, autistic-nonsavants, con-
trols) and question type (primed vs. unprimed questions).
As expected, we found a significant main effect of ques-
tion type (F(1, 55) = 26.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .33) such that
scores were higher for the easier primed questions (M =
14.85, SD = 5.15) compared to unprimed questions (M =
12.97, SD = 5.98). This suggests that participants were ap-
plying rules appropriately in our task and paying attention.
We also found a statistical trend for a main effect of group
(F(2, 55) = 2.56, p = .09, ηp2 = .09), with controls (M =
15.44, SD = 6.04) tending to have overall higher accuracy
scores compared to the autistic-nonsavants (M = 11.60,
SD = 11.30; p = .084), but not compared to the autistic-sa-
vants (M = 14.73, SD = 9.92; p = 1.00). Finally, there was
no significant interaction between group and question
type (F(2, 55) = 1.96, p = .15, ηp2 = .07).
We also conducted a 3 × 2 ANOVA (again, group ×
question) looking at participants’ response times. We
again found a significant main effect of question type
(F(1, 55) = 16.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .23) such that partici-
pants were significantly faster for the easier primed
questions (M = 12,351, SD = 5703) compared to un-
primed questions, as expected (M = 13,994, SD = 6241).
Importantly, we found a significant main effect of group
(F(2, 55) = 4.55, p = .015, ηp2 = .14) and a significant
interaction between group and question type (F(2, 55) =
5.12, p = .009, ηp2 = .07). Detailed explorations revealed
that autistic-savants (M = 17,832, SD = 7500) were sig-
nificantly slower on the unprimed questions (Fig. 7)
compared to both autistic-nonsavants (M = 12,055, SD =
6352; p = .043) and controls (M = 12,094, SD = 4129; p
= .006), and autistic-savants (M = 14,447, SD = 7325)
were significantly slower than controls even on the
primed questions (M = 10,371, SD = 3148; p = .043).
Enjoyment/strategy questionnaire
A one-way ANOVA found no significant differences
(F(2, 53) = 1.41, p = .25) in how much each group
enjoyed learning to calendar calculate (i.e. collapsing
questions Q7, Q8, Q9): for autistic-savants (M = 3.44,
SD = .88), autistic-nonsavants (M = 2.89, SD = 1.17), or
controls (M = 3.42, SD = .77).
In terms of strategy used, we conducted a 3 × 4 ANOVA
crossing group (autistic-savant; autistic-nonsavant; con-
trol) and strategy question (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4; relating re-
spectively to picturing a mental calendar; using the
on-screen timeline Mon, Tues, Wed…; using mental arith-
metic; using rote memorisation of anchor dates). We
found no main effect of group (F(2, 51) = 1.77, p = .180,
ηp2 = .07) and no interaction (F(6, 153) = .93, p = .476,
ηp2 = .35). But we found a significant effect of question
(F(3, 153) = 9.43, p < .001, ηp2 = .16) in that the strategy of
‘picturing a calendar in my head’ was used least often
compared to the other three strategies (all p < .05). No
other comparisons were significant (all p > .05).
Discussion
The results for experiment 2 showed no clear a priori
group advantages in being able to learn to perform cal-
endar calculation skills. However, a significant pattern
emerged for response times in that autistic-savants were
slower than both autistic-nonsavants and controls, when
Table 2 Types of savant skills reported by the autistic-savant
group in experiment 2, some participants reported having
multiple savant skills
Skill types Number of cases
Math 5
Calendar calculation 0
Musical instrument playing 2
Music reproduction 2
Absolute pitch 4
Art 2
Memory 5
Mechanical (building) 1
Fluency for different languages 1
Other 5
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tackling the harder unprimed date questions. They were
also slower than controls even in the simpler primed
questions. This suggests that autistic-savants engaged
with the task in a distinct way compared to the other
groups in that they take longer to respond. We also
found that the least-used strategy was ‘picturing a calen-
dar in my head’ but that all groups reported similar
strategies and enjoyed the task to a similar degree. The
implications of these results are discussed below.
General discussion
The purpose of these studies was to profile the differences
between autistic participants with and without a prodi-
gious talent (autistic-savants and autistic-nonsavants, re-
spectively). The third group was controls with neither
autism nor a prodigious talent. Our findings present the
first empirical evidence to adjudicate between different
theoretical frameworks of savant syndrome in adults. Each
of our results is discussed in turn below in terms of how
they relate to previous models of the development of
savant skills.
Experiment 1 investigated the profile of self-reported dif-
ferences between autistic-savants, autistic-nonsavants, and
controls. We asked all groups to complete self-report mea-
sures from six questionnaires: the Sussex Savant Question-
naire (SSQ), the Glasgow Sensory Questionnaire (GSQ)
[30], the Leyton Obsessional Inventory—short form (LOI)
[40], the Sussex Cognitive Styles Questionnaire (SCSQ)
[41], the Systemising Quotient-Revised (SQ-R) [42], and
the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) [43]. Our aim was to
establish a general profile of individual differences that
might distinguish between autistic individuals who develop
talent and autistic individuals who do not. Our choice of
questionnaires was motivated by previous theories and
findings [3, 15, 16, 23, 24], and we focused on factors re-
lated to sensory sensitivity, obsessive behaviours, different
aspects of cognitive style (e.g. local bias), and autism-related
traits such as systemising and social awareness. We first
briefly describe the (expected) pattern of results that distin-
guished all participants with autism from controls.
We found that both autism groups (autistic-savants
and autistic-nonsavants) differed from controls on key
measures, as predicted from previous literature [30, 43,
46] and theoretical accounts [3]. Both autistic-savants
and autistic-nonsavants, relative to controls, reported
more symptoms related to sensory sensitivity (known
previously to be heightened in autism [30]) and obses-
sive behaviours (a common hallmark of autism [2]), in-
creased systemising (previously shown in autism [46]),
and a more locally oriented cognitive style (theorised as
a feature of autism and savant syndrome and supported
by findings [3, 25] but savant syndrome had not been
separated from autism). Both autism groups also re-
ported the expected generalised autism-related symp-
toms such as poor social, communication, and
imagination skills, as well as poor attention switching
and heightened attention-to-detail, which replicates pre-
vious findings using the same self-report measure in
Fig. 7 Response times for the primed and unprimed dates between groups (error bars show SEM)
Hughes et al. Molecular Autism  (2018) 9:53 Page 13 of 18
autism [43]. These findings are useful in confirming the
validity of our autism classifications (autistic-savant and
autistic-nonsavant) against controls and suggest that sav-
ant syndrome does indeed exist within or alongside aut-
ism based on our measures.
Our key findings relate to differences between autistic-sa-
vants and autistic-nonsavants. We found that these two
groups differed in several ways. First, we considered two
models that theorise why savants engage in many hours of
practice [15, 16]. Happé and Vital’s [15] mind-blindness
theory suggests that autistic-savants practice as a result of
re-dedicating cognitive resources to skill development that
would otherwise be used to monitor social interactions.
This predicts that autistic-savants may show poorer social
skills compared to autistic-nonsavants. Our findings did
not support this hypothesis: there were no differences be-
tween autistic-savants and autistic-nonsavants on social or
communication skills in the AQ (and indeed no difference
in any subscale of the AQ). Since it would have been ex-
pected that autistic-savants would score higher than
autistic-nonsavants on generalised autism-related symp-
toms, we additionally showed that a Bayes factor analysis
supported the null hypothesis of no differences between
these groups for four out of the five AQ sub-scales (social
skills, attention switching, communication, imagination).
This does not necessarily rule out altogether the role of
additional autism-related traits in the development of sav-
ant skills (e.g. a preference for solitary activities), but our
current data suggests that differences on the above mea-
sures may not be strongly apparent when comparing
autistic-savants and autistic-nonsavants.
Instead, we found support for an alternative model by
Simner and colleagues [16] in which practice arises from
increased obsessional traits in autistic-savants. The
autistic-savant group showed higher obsessional traits
compared to autistic-nonsavants, and this was specific-
ally related to the ‘worries/just right’ factor. This factor
relates to the inclination to take one’s time about making
sure things are ‘just right’ (e.g. ‘I do not take a long time
to dress in the morning’ [reverse coded]). This factor
could well be implicated in the development of talent,
for example, when making sure the details of a painting
are ‘just right’ or putting additional effort into learning a
number list perfectly without error. The second feature
of the ‘worries/just right’ factor (i.e. excessive worries
about, e.g. bumping into people or the belief in unlucky
numbers) raises an interesting possibility that obsessive
rehearsal in savants might be driven by anxiety. If so,
then savant skills may be guided by the same
anxiety-laden motivations that drive, for example, repeti-
tive OCD behaviour [19]. Indeed, seven autistic-savants
(compared to two autistic-nonsavants and one control)
scored above the threshold for OCD symptoms although
our small numbers did not allow us to support this
statistically. We are therefore exploring in subsequent
studies how anxiety may be implicated in the develop-
ment of savant skills. Overall, the above results suggest
that practice in savant skills is driven by obsessional
(possibly anxiety-linked) behaviours in autistic-savants
compared to autistic-nonsavants [16] rather than freed-
up resources from mind-blindness [15].
We also investigated other areas of cognition/percep-
tion, drawn from several theoretical accounts [3, 23, 24].
We found that autistic-savants scored higher on the Sys-
temising Quotient-Revised (SQ-R; although not on the
shorter ‘systemising’ factor of the Cognitive Styles Ques-
tionnaire; SCSQ). We also found that autistic-savants
scored higher on ‘technical/ spatial’ elements of the
SCSQ which relates to technical interests, mathematical
ability, and the use of spatial mental imagery—but also
contains several questions which are systemising in na-
ture (e.g. ‘If I were buying a stereo, I would want to
know about its precise technical features.’). Together,
these findings of higher systemising and technical/spatial
abilities of savants support the model by Baron-Cohen
et al. [23] who proposed that savant skills emerge from
increased systemising in autistic-savants. Where we
found null results between all group comparisons, we
additionally computed Bayes factors to assess whether
our results truly reflected no differences. Here our ana-
lysis supported evidence for the null hypothesis of no
differences between autistic-savants and autistic-nonsa-
vants on the imagery ability and language and word
forms sub-scales of the SCSQ; therefore, our current
data suggest that these aspects of cognition may not be
involved in the facilitation of savant skills.
Local processing has also been theorised as important in
the development of savant skills, as suggested by the en-
hanced perceptual functioning model (EPF) [3]. However,
we found no difference in self-reported local processing
traits between autistic-savants and autistic-nonsavants,
and so fail to support this proposal from the current data.
Bennet and Heaton [22] found a similar pattern to us in
savant children and adolescents based on parental reports
(no local processing advantage for autistic-savants over
autistic-nonsavants). Importantly, however, Pring et al.
[26] show that enhanced local processing abilities in
savants (relative to autistic-nonsavants) might only be
revealed by a more engaging task. As such, the EPF model
by Mottron et al. [3] has been supported by behavioural
evidence in certain engaging tasks, but not by our self-re-
port data here.
Finally, we investigated the theory that the develop-
ment of savant skills might be tied to heightened sensory
sensitivity [23]. Our autistic-savants reported signifi-
cantly more symptoms related to sensory sensitivity
lending support to the theory that sensory sensitivity
could act as an initial catalyst in the emergence of savant
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talent. Baron-Cohen et al. also made claims that sensory
sensitivity might increase attention-to-detail. However,
although we found this trait to be heightened in our aut-
ism groups globally, there was no difference in
attention-to-detail between our autistic-savants and
autistic-nonsavants. Having said this, our Bayes analysis
suggested that no firm conclusions could be drawn
about group differences in attention to detail; therefore,
future studies may wish to further investigate this. Inter-
estingly, the finding of heightened sensory sensitivity in
our savant group relates more broadly to another condi-
tion, synaesthesia, which also has a distinct sensory com-
ponent. As noted in the Background, synaesthesia
produces sensory experiences that are induced by un-
usual stimuli (e.g. letters or numbers might induce
colour sensations). Synaesthesia has been linked to aut-
ism previously [48, 49], and Ward et al. [50] showed that
both conditions share common links in their profile of
sensory sensitivities. More recently, synaesthesia has
been specifically tied to savant syndrome rather than
autism per se [39]. So our current data combined with
previous evidence further suggests that sensory compo-
nents may be an important mediating link between aut-
ism and the development of savant skills, perhaps even
via synaesthesia itself [16].
In experiment 2, we taught the three groups the novel
skill of calendar calculation and tested their abilities after
three tutorials. We aimed to examine whether autistic-
savants would show advantages in learning this skill
compared to autistic-nonsavants and controls, as pre-
dicted by the ‘veridical mapping’ model [24]. Veridical
mapping links savant talent to an enhanced ability to de-
tect regularities within and between systems. Calendar
calculation requires this skill par excellence because
weekdays can be mapped to dates by understanding the
underlying regularities in the calendar—which we taught
to the participants in our study. In contrast to veridical
mapping, practice-based models of savant skills might
not predict immediate advantages prior to prolonged
training [15, 16]. We found no evidence to support the
veridical mapping model since autistic-savants were no
more accurate than autistic-nonsavants or even controls.
It is possible that differences in accuracy may have been
observed if participants were given a longer period of
training, for instance, if autistic-savants were given more
time to consolidate their learning. Indeed, calendar cal-
culation is often assumed to develop as a result of pe-
riods of study which are far longer than our training
session. However, we show that calendar calculation is
surprisingly easy to acquire with around 75% accuracy
after merely 35 min of training even in the control
group.
Importantly, we did find that autistic-savants took sig-
nificantly longer to answer our calendar calculation
questions: they were slower than both autistic-nonsa-
vants and controls for (difficult) unprimed questions and
slower than controls even on (easier) primed questions.
One interpretation of this is that our autistic-savant par-
ticipants may have found the task more difficult com-
pared to the other groups. But given that all subjects
began with the same level of mental maths ability (as
measure by our test in experiment 2), a more plausible
interpretation is that, autistic-savants engaged with the
task differently by adopting a more careful, effortful ap-
proach with increased checking. This would fall in line
with the findings from experiment 1 that autistic-savants
show more obsessional behaviours, specifically related to
taking a long time to get things ‘just right’ (see results
above for the Leyton Obsessional Inventory). Indeed, the
magnitude of the differences between groups for re-
sponse times (autistic-savants took more than 5 s longer
on average than nonsavants) suggests again they may
have taken longer to check and re-check their answers.
Overall, experiment 2 lends support to practice-based
models of savant skills rather than veridical mapping
since autistic-savants did not show immediate advan-
tages on this skill prior to extended training and they ap-
pear to display a more engaged, effortful approach to the
task.
One limitation of the current study is that we validated sa-
vants with a detailed self-report questionnaire rather than by
objective tests. This is largely because savant syndrome is an
umbrella term for many different heterogeneous manifesta-
tions (e.g. calendar- calculation, drawing, music etc.). We did
however validate our approach by showing a ‘dose-like’ effect
of savant skills on one of our other measures: the number of
savant skills reported in our questionnaire correlated posi-
tively with the strength of savants’ technical-spatial abilities.
In other words, although talents are described only in
self-report (rather than objectively evaluated), this self-report
appears to be a reliable metric since it correlates with a trait
that particularly separates autistic-savants from autistic-non-
savants. Nevertheless, future investigations might focus on
objectively verifying self-reported skills with a battery of tests
designed to measure specific savant skills (e.g. absolute pitch,
language skills), and we have embarked on this program of
research in our own lab. A further limitation of our study
was the fact that we had a high proportion of females in the
control group compared to our two autism groups. None-
theless, we conducted an additional analysis where we had
found main effects (i.e. sensory sensitivity, obsessional traits,
technical-spatial skills, and systemising) showing that our
pattern of results was maintained across all groups even after
controlling for gender.
Conclusions
Our results demonstrate a diverse range of attributes
that distinguish autistic-savants from autistic-nonsavants
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in adults based on both self-report and an objective test.
Our findings suggest that savant syndrome is defined by
observable differences in aspects of cognition, percep-
tion, and behaviour that go beyond the mere presence of
savant skills themselves. We found that areas of particu-
lar influence on savant talent relate specifically to higher
sensory sensitivity (supporting Baron-Cohen et al. [23]),
obsessive behaviour (supporting, e.g. Simner et al. [16]),
and systemising and technical/spatial traits (supporting
Baron-Cohen et al. [23]) along with a more careful and
engaged learning style when presented with a novel sav-
ant skill (supporting practice models such as Simner et
al. [16]). We did not find social skills [15], local process-
ing [3], or increased pattern detection in calendar-calcu-
lation [24] to be distinguishing features between
autistic-savants and autistic-nonsavants. Our study is
novel in the savant literature by clarifying the role of dif-
ferent traits and behaviours in the development of prodi-
gious talent, in order to distinguish between previous
theories that suggested the developmental pathway of
the emergence of talent in autism. Our preliminary find-
ings should be used to guide further research in delin-
eating the direction and relative contribution of the
factors identified in our study. Exploring further how
these factors might influence different abilities (e.g.
maths, music, art etc.) could be an important next step
in our understanding of savant skills. Our current find-
ings are important in defining savant syndrome as a le-
gitimate sub-group of autism.
Endnotes
1Calculation of a Bayes factor allows the evaluation of
null results to determine whether the data supports evi-
dence for the null against the alternative hypothesis [51].
Bayes factors are evaluated along a continuum although
typically, a Bayes factor (BF) > .33 provides moderate
support for the null hypothesis while a Bayes factor of >
3 provides moderate support for the alternative hypoth-
esis, and values in between indicate no firm conclusions
should be drawn.
2We note that there were gender imbalances in our
participant samples across groups (see [46] for example
gender effects in autism). Given this, we repeated all
analyses where we had found main effects (i.e. sensory
sensitivity, obsessional traits, technical-spatial skills, and
systemising) but this time ran ANCOVAs with gender
entered as a covariate. Even after controlling for gender,
all of our main effects were maintained: for sensory sen-
sitivity (F(2, 111) = 28.06, p < .001, ηp2 = .34), obses-
sional traits (F(2, 111) = 7.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .13),
technical-spatial skills (F(2, 111) = 6.36, p = .002,
ηp2 = .11), and systemising (F(2, 91) = 22.09, p < .001,
ηp2 = .34). In addition, the pattern of results for all our
post hoc comparisons were maintained with autistic-
savants scoring higher than both autistic-nonsavants and
controls across all measures (all p’s < 0.05) while
autistic-nonsavants scored higher than controls across
all measures (p’s < .05) apart from obsessional traits and
technical-spatial abilities (p > .05). In other words,
gender had very little effect on our overall pattern of
findings, and importantly, it had no effect whatsoever
on our key findings comparing autistic-savants and
autistic nonsavants.
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